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Between Fact and Fiction
The 26th Battalion, the “Crater Fight,” and the 
“Myth of the War Experience” 
C U R T  M A I N V I L L E
Abstract : In October 1915, during only their second tour of the front line, 
New Brunswick’s 26th Battalion conducted a reconnaissance-in-force 
upon a recently detonated German mine in front of their firing trench. 
The “crater fight,” as it has come to be known, resulted in twenty-one 
dead and thirty-six wounded but was portrayed as a success. But how 
much of what was printed in local newspapers was true? Official reports 
and personal accounts were engaging, idealistic and emotive. They were 
also highly exaggerated. This was the genesis of the “myth of the war 
experience”—a marriage of both fact and fiction that reflected multiple 
(and sometimes conflicting) points of view and satisfied competing 
personal, military, social and political interests.
At one point, under cover of smoke, a party of thirty men, under Major 
W.R. Brown, of the 26th Battalion ... left our trench to examine a 
crater close to the German Parapet, where the enemy was thought to 
be carrying on some work. An enemy bombardment was in progress, 
and heavy rifle and machine gun fire was opened on the party. Major 
Brown was wounded in the advance, but continued to direct operations. 
The crater was entered by a few men under Lieutenants Fairweather 
and McPhee and rendered untenable to the enemy. The crater was then 
evacuated.
—Daily Telegraph, 18 October 19151
1  “Brilliant Exploit of Thirty Men from the Fighting 26th,” St. John Standard, 18 
October 1915, 1. The same report was printed in all of the province’s six dailies and 
reprinted in part in many of New Brunswick’s regional weeklies.
© Canadian Military History 2020
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The reporT of the Canadian Eye-Witness—one of the few officially sanctioned sources of wartime information from the 
Western Front—came as a pleasant surprise to New Brunswick 
readers. It was the first mention of the province’s 26th Battalion 
since that unit’s arrival at the front in late September 1915. It also 
prompted Sir Sam Hughes, Canada’s audacious Minister of Militia and 
Defence, to comment that New Brunswick’s battalion had “greatly 
distinguished themselves.”2 But what exactly happened at this crater 
and why was it significant? This brief illustration, hastily prepared 
by Sir Max Aitken and his propaganda team at the Canadian War 
Records Office from official reports of the 5th Brigade and the 2nd 
Canadian Division, was notoriously short on detail. However, this did 
not prevent the province’s newspapers from promoting the “crater 
fight,” as it has come to be known, as a momentous event in both the 
battalion’s and the province’s history.
The ‘real’ story of the crater fight was only brought to light 
in early November, three weeks after the attack, when numerous 
letters were published by local newspapers. Military censors managed 
to obscure some of the more salient details, such as the location 
of the attack. Nonetheless, many of these stories offered a vivid if 
not contradictory account of what actually happened on 13 October. 
Historical inaccuracies aside, these first-hand accounts were often 
reprinted in multiple newspapers around the province, feeding an 
insatiable public desire for news of the battalion’s baptism of fire and 
incubating a sense of pride and purpose for the battalion. But just 
how much of this story was true? Was the crater fight, as Captain the 
Reverend E.B. Hooper claimed, “the first great toll of New Brunswick 
blood for king and country ... a baptism of blood” or was it closer 
2  “The 26th Battalion Won its Spurs: New Brunswick Battalion Wins Glory on 
Battlefield by a Gallant Charge Against German Position, Which was Destroyed,” 
Daily Gleaner (Fredericton), 18 October 1915, 5.
2
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to what Lieutenant C.M. Lawson described to his mother—a “very 
small affair” that “has been horribly exaggerated”?3
In truth, the crater fight was all of these things—a marriage 
of both fact and fiction that reflected multiple (and sometimes 
conflicting) points of view and satisfied competing personal, military, 
social and political interests. Much was at stake, even as early as 
1915: if the Second Battle of Ypres only months earlier illustrated 
the lengths to which all of these forces would go to shape a unifying 
Canadian narrative, then the crater fight demonstrates just how 
much the official record and personal correspondence could be used 
to promote an equally compelling regional mythology to the First 
World War. Courage, self-sacrifice and success on the battlefield: these 
qualities were the embodiment of the “myth of the war experience” 
and necessary ingredients in the elevation of a relatively minor event 
to a provincial sensation.4
the battalion
The 26th Battalion was New Brunswick’s preeminent First 
World War unit, but it was not the first battalion raised in that 
3  Captain (Reverend) E.B. Hooper, 17 October 1915, “‘He that is not with us is 
against us,’ Chaplain’s Call to Men from the Front,” Daily Telegraph (Saint John), 2 
November 1915, 3; and Lieutenant C.M. Lawson to Mrs. Lawson, 21 November 1915, 
Lawson, JI – F105b – 3, Jessie I. Lawson Fonds, New Brunswick Museum. Lawson, 
who was killed in action six weeks after the crater fight, was a harsh critic of battlefield 
reporting. In this final letter to his mother, he made his feelings unmistakably clear: 
“You talk about my writing to the newspaper or a letter for publication. Well in 
the first place that is absolutely forbidden, and besides when one reads the drivel 
that is published you never want to see anything of your own in print. Really some 
of the stories about that very small affair at the crater are ridiculous. Certainly the 
battalion gained credit there, but it has been horribly exaggerated. I am enclosing a 
clipping from the “Telegraph” about the 25th [likely “Two St. John Homes Mourn 
Dead in War,” Daily Telegraph and the Sun, 25 October 1915, 10] which is the 
greatest balderdash. Really it discusts [sic] one, and a few fools who write this trash 
home throw discredit on the whole.”
4  Jonathan F. Vance, Death So Noble: Memory, Meaning, and the First World War 
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1997), 142. Vance was not the 
first to speak of the “myth of the war experience;” he was, however, one of the first 
to contextualise it from a Canadian perspective.
3
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province.5 That honour goes to the 12th Battalion of the Canadian 
Expeditionary Force’s first contingent. The 12th Battalion—more 
a Maritime unit than a singularly New Brunswick effort—found 
no difficulty in recruiting to strength when the call was made in 
August 1914. However, as other units were forwarded to the front 
with the 1st Division, the 12th was relegated to reserve status in 
England where it served as a training depot for the reinforcement of 
frontline battalions. The subsequent formation of the 26th Battalion 
in October 1914, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel (Lt-Col) 
James Lupton McAvity, carried the hope that it would serve at the 
front as a distinct provincial unit.
It took considerably more effort to bring the 26th Battalion up to 
wartime strength. Public perception was wary that New Brunswick’s 
effort might once again be dismissed by military officials. Recruiting 
was dulled by the province’s limited access to young, urban, British-
born males—a paradigm that has come to define the typical First 
World War soldier and who could be found in abundance in Ontario 
and the Canadian West.6 Through the adoption of recruiting 
meetings and more active methods to reach potential recruits in 
5  S. Douglas MacGowan, Mac Heckbert and Byron E. O’Leary provide a detailed 
account of the 26th Battalion, including the famed crater fight, in their New 
Brunswick’s Fighting 26th: a history of the 26th New Brunswick Battalion, C.E.F., 
1914-1919 (Saint John, NB: Neptune Publishing Co., 1995), 43-50. J. Brent Wilson’s 
A Family of Brothers (Fredericton, NB: Goose Lane, 2019) builds upon this earlier 
work by adding personal accounts, statistics and images that were not previously 
available to MacGowan, Heckbert and O’Leary. Neither account delves deeply into 
the controversies and contradictions that followed the crater fight.
6  The wartime impression that Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF) enlistees 
tended to be young, urban, British-born males was supported by immediate post-war 
statistical analysis. This distinct pattern or paradigm has been refined by modern 
historians, including Robert Brown and Donald Loveridge’s inclusion of an economic 
element to the equation and geographer Chris Sharpe’s groundbreaking analysis 
of regional CEF enlistment, but remains largely unchallenged. Only recently have 
historians attempted to measure and explain the impact of individual elements within 
this pattern. The author’s own work reinforces the paradigm but simultaneously 
exposes a number of noteworthy variations and exceptions. See Short History of the 
First Canadian Division, December 1928, RG 24, Vol. 1810, GAQ 2-1, Library and 
Archives Canada [LAC]; Robert Brown and Donald Loveridge, “Unrequited Faith 
Recruiting the CEF 1914-1918,” Canadian Military History 24, 1 (Winter/Spring 
2015), 61-87; C.A. Sharpe, “Enlistment in the Canadian Expeditionary Force 1914-
1918: A Regional Analysis,” Journal of Canadian Studies 18, 4 (Winter 1983-1984), 
15-29; and Curt Mainville, “The Middlemore Boys: Immigration, Settlement, and 
Great War Volunteerism in New Brunswick,” Acadiensis 42, 2 (Summer/Autumn, 
2013), 51-74.
4
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rural communities outside of the province’s urban centres, the 26th 
achieved its mandate by late fall of 1914.
The mobilisation of the 26th Battalion in Saint John was not 
without its challenges. Morale among the soldiers and population 
was generally high; discipline, however, was uneven. Desertions 
were common. Soldiers, when not training, had much free time to 
themselves. Evenings were a test to military and civilian police, who 
were often overwhelmed in the presence of large groups of drunken, 
sometimes unruly soldiers. Fights broke out. So followed acts of 
vandalism and rioting. More than a few public calls were made for 
the removal of the battalion from the city. The eventual departure of 
the 26th for England in June 1915 was greeted with a genuine chorus 
of cheers for New Brunswick’s battalion and considerable relief.7
Following four months of additional training at Salisbury Plain, 
the 26th Battalion was sent to Western Flanders on 15 September 
1915. Only months after the Second Battle of Ypres introduced 
poison gas to the modern battlefield, British and German forces were 
7  Wilson, A Family of Brothers, 23-37.
Scene on transport Caledonia. 26th Battalion Saint John Fusiliers Leaving for Overseas 
Service, Saint John, New Brunswick , 13 June 1915. [New Brunswick Museum 19691]
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now firmly entrenched into defensive positions that made wholesale 
attack difficult. The 5th Canadian Brigade inherited ground formerly 
held by the British 83rd Brigade in the Ypres Salient. Within the 
brigade, the 26th Battalion occupied interchangeable trenches with 
the 22nd Battalion—six days in, six days out—overlooking the town 
of Wytschaete, or “Whitesheets” as the British called it, only a mile 
away. The battalion covered approximately 700 yards of frontage 
along K and L lines. Ahead of them lay no man’s land, a narrow 
corridor between combatants that ranged from as little as 60 yards 
to approximately 200 yards at its widest. Beyond that was the 3rd 
Bavarian Division. The 26th Battalion took the line for the first time 
on 28 September with little incident.8 Their second tour would prove 
considerably more exciting.
8  War Diaries, 5th Canadian Infantry Brigade [C.I.B.], September 1915, Appendix 
B, Operational Order No. 6, 27 September 1915, RG 9 III-D-3, Vol. 4883, Part 2, 
File 246, LAC.
Soldiers of the 26th Battalion dig trenches during training in southern England, summer 
1915. [Captain F.F. May Collection, 26th Battalion Overseas Association Inc.]
6
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the crater fight
On 8 October 1915, three German mines were detonated along the 
Canadian line at Wytschaete. The first explosion occurred at 9:30 
a.m. near Vandamme Farm opposite trench position “K1,” between 
the 22nd and 25th Battalions.9 Two more mines were blown between 
5:30 and 6:00 p.m. further down the line at positions “H4” and “G1,” 
creating sizable craters in front of and behind trenches occupied by 
the 28th Battalion. The crater at K1 was the largest, measuring 
150 feet long by 45 feet wide and 30 feet in depth, but caused little 
damage. Situated approximately 45 yards from the Canadian firing 
trench, the crater was in the centre of no man’s land and posed many 
questions for command: was the crater the result of a mine explosion 
that fell short of its intended target or was it meant to serve as a 
firing base for German forces as divisional headquarters suspected?10
That question was put to the 26th Battalion when they took over 
K and L lines from the 22nd Battalion on 9 October. Over successive 
evenings, as fatigue parties hastily constructed a sap from K1 towards 
the crater, patrols were sent into no man’s land to survey German 
activities inside the crater. The first, led by Lieutenant (Lt) C.D. 
Knowlton, was detailed on the evening of the 11th. He was authorised 
to attack the crater if his patrol held the advantage—500 sandbags 
and a small working party were held at the ready to construct a 
defensive position if needed—but an ominous development at the 
crater favoured caution over courage:
Our party, which consisted of 2 officers and 15 men, as per Genl 
[General] Watson’s orders, found the crater guarded by 3 sentries who 
were behind an earth work almost 6’ high. There was considerable 
difficulty in getting near. It was found that the top of the crater had 
been boarded in and it was on these boards that sentries were standing. 
9  The actual location of the crater is difficult to pinpoint. Divisional references place 
the K1 crater at map co-ordinates N.18.c.5.1. Brigade locates it closer to N.24.a.7.9, 
approximately 140 yards away and inside German lines. Contemporary maps of the 
area show a crater at N.24.a.5.9, between the two references. This fits the description 
that the crater was centered midway between the Canadian and German lines.
10  War Diaries, 2nd Canadian Division, October 1915, Appendix 25, Daily Intelligence 
Summary No. 17, 9 October 1915, RG 9 III-D-3, Vol. 4842, File 99, LAC. See also, in 
the same war diaries, Appendix 36, Daily Intelligence Summary No. 17, 12 October 
1915: “There is apparently a determination on the part of the enemy to extend the 
crater opposite K1 laterally along our line and to make of this the nucleus of a new 
fire trench. Preventive action is being taken.”
7
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View of the front lines from J Trench (map reference point v.), looking north northwest to southeast. [Source images © IWM Q41949 - Q41957.]
iii. Red Chateau
ii. Vandenberghe Farm
Approx. location of K1 Crater
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The Wytschaete front photographed from Vierstraat. [Source images © IWM Q37893 - Q37899.]
vi. i. Vandamme Farm
iii. Red Chateau
ii. Vandenberghe Farm
iv. Wytschaete Church
Approx. location of K1 Crater
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The Wytschaete front photographed from Desine Farm. [Source images © IWM Q37594 - Q37600.]
i. Vandamme Farm
iii. Red Chateau
ii. Vandenberghe Farm
iv. Wytschaete Church
vi.
Approx. location 
of K1 Crater
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Working parties (estimate 12 men altogether) could be heard humming, 
singing & talking. Five explosions were heard at ends of crater—
apparently extending it along in front. By the time our party could 
get to the position and get particulars it was very late and the party 
could only get back to our trenches at 2 a.m. It was too late to deliver 
an attack [unreadable] this place. [unreadable] appear to have a good 
[unreadable] they could always reinforce their garrison—whereas we 
have to cross open ground. The difficulties of taking and holding this 
crater are very great at present. Mining from this side or bombarding 
with H.E. [high explosives] seems only successful way of handling the 
situation.11
Lt-Col McAvity’s follow-up report to 5th Brigade Headquarters 
recommended an attack-in-force to displace the Germans in the 
K1 crater. “The enemy appears to have made it bomb-proof,” he 
advised Brigadier-General David Watson. “I am of the opinion that 
only a very strong attack could possibly carry this place without 
the assistance of mining or heavy artillery fire.” Both the Canadians 
and the Germans appeared to be sapping towards the crater 
simultaneously. If the Germans already held the position, McAvity 
pointed out, then they would hold a distinct tactical advantage over 
the Canadians: “the Germans can very easily reinforce a garrison in 
the crater or they can very easily withdraw one, whereas, for us to 
do either, necessitates crossing open ground and pierce the roof of 
the crater. Our men would therefore be very easily bombed out from 
the German lines.”12
General Watson, upon inspecting the crater, approved an attack 
for the evening of the 12th. A small party, consisting of twelve men, 
would approach the crater from the front to remove the sentries; 
simultaneously, two larger parties of twenty men each would envelop 
and bombard the crater from each flank. Meanwhile, two parties of 
twenty-five men each would wait in the newly constructed sap and 
in reserve to press the attack as required. McAvity understood the 
11  “Report on Patrol in Front of KIA,” 12 October 1915, RG 9 III, Vol. 4122, 
Folder 4, File 1, LAC. See also 26th Battalion, Operations, 2 Memos, O.C. [Officer 
Commanding], 26th Battalion to Lieut. C.D. Knowlton, 11 October 1915, RG 9 III, 
Vol. 4122, Folder 4, File 1, LAC.
12  26th Battalion, Operations, “Report on operations, night 11th – 12th October, 
in connection with German crater opposite K1,” n.d., RG 9 III, Vol. 4122, Folder 4, 
File 1, LAC.
11
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importance of fire support and advised Major (Maj) Walter R. Brown, 
whose “A” Company would lead the attack, to position the battalion’s 
six machine guns where they would be most advantageous.13 He also 
cautioned Brown against overplaying the attack: “You are not to 
attempt to storm the crater unless you are satisfied that enough 
damage has been done by the bombardment to warrant.”14 For 
reasons that are unclear—but may be related to an impending 
“demonstration” by the British Second Army—the midnight attack 
was called off.
That demonstration, a feint by Second Army to distract German 
forces as the British massed on Loos, was scheduled for the afternoon of 
13 October.15 It consisted of a ninety minute artillery barrage followed 
by the deployment of smoke to obscure the battlefield. Machine gun 
and “shrapnel fire” was encouraged “to make the enemy believe that 
an assault is intended.”16 Within the 2nd Canadian Division, only the 
26th Battalion had orders to enter no man’s land. The plan of attack 
on the crater was based primarily on that proposed for the evening 
of the 12th, with several modifications: firstly, one hundred men from 
“B” Company were to be placed at the battalion strong point to 
render assistance to “A” Company; secondly, the flanking party of 
bombers was to be reduced from two parties of twenty to a total 
of thirty men—the “picked thirty”; and lastly, the fifty men held in 
reserve were not to wait for the crater to be secured, but would “rush 
forward and fortify the crater and hold same at all costs.”17
This final point suggests that the attack may have evolved from 
a simple reconnaissance-in-force. It implies, at least in the mind of 
Lt-Col McAvity, that the crater held significant tactical importance, 
enough to warrant the commitment of two untested companies on a 
risky daylight attack. Not all of his officers were convinced that the 
plan would succeed: “The day we picked to do it was perhaps the 
13  26th Battalion, Operations, Field Message, O.C., 26th Battalion to O.C., A Coy, 
12 October 1915, RG 9 III, Vol. 4122, Folder 4, File 1, LAC.
14  26th Battalion, Operations, Field Message, O.C., 26th Battalion to O.C., A Coy, 
12 October 1915, RG 9 III, Vol. 4122, Folder 4, File 1, LAC.
15  G.W.L. Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1919: Official History of 
the Canadian Army in the First World War (Ottawa: Queens Printer, 1962), 121.
16  War Diaries, 2nd Canadian Division, October 1915, Appendix 30, Canadian Corps 
No. G 583 to 2nd Canadian Division, 11 October 1915, RG 9 III-D-3, Vol. 4842, File 
99, LAC.
17  26th Battalion, Operations, Memo, O.C., 26th Battalion to 5th C.I.B., n.d., RG 9 
III, Vol. 4122, Folder 4, File 1, LAC.
12
Canadian Military History, Vol. 29 [2020], Iss. 2, Art. 4
https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol29/iss2/4
  13M A I N V I L L E 
worst we could have chosen,” explained Maj Brown to a Saint John 
reporter after the fact. “The reason being that ... the enemy always 
expects a general charge after a severe artillery bombardment.”18 
McAvity, despite losing the element of surprise, was confident in 
his plan and issued supplementary orders to each of his company 
commanders: officers should be prepared to press any advantage to 
take ground; adequate supplies of ammunition should be ready to 
replenish all machine gunners and bombers; entrenching tools should 
be handy in the event they are needed; and every soldier should be 
provisioned for a protracted engagement.19
The bombardment commenced at 2:00 p.m., as scheduled, 
concentrating on Petit Bois to the immediate south and east of the 
K1 crater. At 3:30, smoke bombs were thrown over the Canadian 
parapets at intervals of one bomb for every two and a half feet of 
frontage.  Canadian mortar and machine gun fire was soon matched 
by German light and heavy artillery. The experience was intense, 
if not erratic. “At times the earth fairly rocked under one’s feet,” 
described Lt H.W. Ferguson of the  battlefield around him, “especially 
when those ‘coal boxes’ landed, throwing immense pillars of black 
smoke and earth into the air for sixty to a hundred feet, digging 
immense holes in the earth wherever they landed.”20 “I tell you it was 
wild,” wrote Private (Pte) Fred Breau to his father. “It’s as bad as I 
want to see it. I saw men flying up in the air.”21 Sergeant (Sgt) W.B. 
Graham was charged with transporting high explosive bombs to the 
soldiers of “A” Company in the front line: “The German shells were 
exploding all around, with rifle fire, machine Guns, and everything 
a human can invest. I was never so relieved in my life as when we 
landed our load at the proper place.”22
18  “Major Brown of 26th in City; Tells of the Famous Crater Fight,” Daily Telegraph, 
27 December 1915, 6. He repeated his comments in a speech to the Rotary Club only 
days later: “Some New Points in Gallant Story of Crater Fight,” Daily Telegraph, 4 
January 1916, 10.
19  26th Battalion, Operations, Memo, O.C., 26th Battalion to All Coy. Commanders, 
Machine Gun & Bombing Officer, 13 October 1915, RG 9 III, Vol. 4122, Folder 4, 
File 1, LAC.
20  Lieutenant H.W. Ferguson to Rev. T.P. Drumm, n.d., “Twelve-Year-Old Pleads to 
Go to Front as Bugler,” Daily Telegraph, 4 November 1915, 6.
21  Fred Breau to James Breau, 17 October 1915, “‘More exciting than a Cove picnic,’ 
Writes Corp. Breau,” Daily Telegraph, 9 November 1915, 4.
22  Sergeant W.B. Graham to his wife, 16 October 1915, “Interesting Letters from the 
Soldier Boys,” St. Croix Courier, 11 November, 1915, 1.
13
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At 4:00 p.m., Maj Brown led elements of “A” Company into 
no man’s land and received a gunshot wound to his foot almost 
as soon as he left the trenches. He kept moving. The two bombing 
parties advanced first, manoeuvring left and right of the crater. 
The reconnaissance party, under Lt C.E. Fairweather, with a 
detachment of four engineers under the direction of Lt M.N. McPhee, 
departed next and moved directly to the crater. The whole of the 
battlefield remained obscured by dense smoke from the Canadian 
line. According to Lt-Col McAvity’s official report to Brigade 
headquarters, the attacking party was enfiladed from both sides of 
the German line by machine gun and rifle fire but reached the crater 
relatively unmolested. The flanking parties found the crater occupied 
by German bombers who were driven back to their own firing line 
through a communication trench that had been constructed between 
the two positions. The reconnaissance party found no defensive 
works of any kind in the crater and, seeing no value in holding the 
crater, began their withdrawal to Canadian lines under heavy enemy 
bombardment. No sooner had the crater been evacuated then a mine 
was detonated inside the basin. At this point, the smoke screen began 
to dissipate. More smoke was produced, but for several minutes the 
attacking party was fully exposed to German fire.23 In the tense 
minutes that followed, as casualties mounted, several men followed Lt 
F.B. Winter’s call for volunteers to extricate the wounded.
Lt McPhee’s report of the crater fight offers additional details: he 
noted that the size and depth of the crater was significantly smaller 
than had originally been assessed—fifty feet in diameter as opposed 
to one hundred and fifty feet long. While he makes no mention of a 
communication trench running between the crater and German lines, 
he confirmed that there was no tunnel linking the two positions—“I 
had gun cotton in my sap head to move up and blow in any tunnels 
we might find there. There was no tunnel and no sap.” McPhee’s 
most important observation concerned the lack of a German defensive 
perimeter inside the crater. “After we were in the crater for a couple 
of minutes,” he continued, “the Germans started throwing in hand 
grenades. They fell right in the crater. I do not know if there was an 
officer of the 26th there or not, but I ordered all of the men out of the 
23  26th Battalion, Operations, O.C., 26th Battalion to 5th C.I.B., “Report on this 
Afternoon’s Action,” 2200 hrs, 13 October 1915, RG 9 III, Vol. 4122, Folder 4, File 
1, LAC.
15
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crater. We lined up on our side of the crater. There was no object in 
holding it. It was nothing but a death trap.”24
Any idea of holding the crater “at all costs” was abandoned when 
it was realised that the crater held no tactical value and that any 
defence of the crater would have been costly owing to its proximity 
to the German firing line. Lt McPhee made no mention of having 
detected a German mine in his report; nonetheless, his order to 
retreat could not have been timelier. “Our engineer officer yelled 
out ‘about turn: it’s mined,’” wrote Lt Ferguson, “and two thirds 
of our fellows got out before it blew up.”25 An anonymous observer 
recounted the same story: “owing to the presence of mind of the 
engineer officer with our party we might have lost more men than we 
did. This officer gave the order (so I was told) to about turn and get 
out of the crater.”26 The Germans detonated their improvised mine 
24  26th Battalion, Operations, O.C., Report, Lieut. M.M. McPhee to O.C., 26th 
Battalion, 13 October 1915, RG 9 III, Vol. 4122, Folder 4, File 1, LAC.
25  Lt. H.W. Ferguson to W.H. Ferguson, 14 October 1915, “Gripping Story of the 
Soldiers Battles,” Campbellton Graphic, 4 November 1915, 1.
26  Unidentified Officer, 14 October 1915, “Sergt. Ryder, of 26th, for V.C.,” St. John 
Globe, 3 November 1915, 5.
Members of the 26th Battalionrush over open ground during training in England. [Captain F.F. 
May Collection, 26th Battalion Overseas Association Inc.]
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only minutes too late. Pte William McKay says that he was the last 
to retreat: “I was the last one to come out of the crater, and I just got 
out in time, when it went up in smoke.”27
In both after-action reports, the critical moment in the attack 
was not the assault upon the crater itself—that appears to have 
been executed according to plan—but the withdrawal to Canadian 
lines. Intermittent smoke exposed retreating soldiers to enemy fire; 
consequently, the bulk of casualties among the attacking party 
appear to have been rendered between the crater and the sap leading 
out from K1. Lt McPhee reports having seen ten dead and wounded 
upon his return to the line. Privates Maurice McPhee and Robert 
Knowles lay lifeless on the edge of the crater. Pte Roy Brady, shot 
through the arm within feet of the German firing trench, was buried 
by a shell explosion and had to be dug out by his friend, Pte Will 
Reid. Pte McKay says that he tried to rescue Pte Robert Keenan, 
“but they played the machine gun on me and liquid gas, and my 
clothes were afire four or five times, so I had to go back, crawling on 
my stomach.”28
Casualties as a result of the crater fight were high, but were not 
limited to the bombing and reconnaissance parties. At 5:20 p.m., 
German heavy artillery bombarded the Canadian line in retaliation 
for the “demonstration,” resulting in considerable damage to the 
front line and communication trenches. Machine gun officer Lt 
A.D. Carter suffered shrapnel wounds to his hip and thigh. Lance-
Corporal R.F. Peacock was standing in the doorway of Maj Brown’s 
dug-out describing how lucky he was to be alive when a shell landed 
directly behind him, killing him instantly. “Had it not been for the 
fact that he was standing there,” confessed Brown, “the shell would 
most certainly have killed me.”29 In total, the 26th Battalion lost 
twenty-one men killed and thirty-six wounded, equivalent to one-
half of a company. These numbers do not include those men who 
were only slightly wounded and remained at duty and those, like Pte 
Breau—who suffered a ruptured ear drum from an artillery blast—
who reported their injuries well after the battle. 
27  Private William McKay to Robert McKay, 17 October 1915, “Twelve-Year-Old 
Pleads to Go to Front as Bugler,” Daily Telegraph, 4 November 1915, 6.
28  Private William McKay to Robert McKay, “Twelve-Year-Old Pleads to Go to 
Front as Bugler,” 6.
29  Kenneth Linton to Mrs. Amenia Linton, 16 October 1915, “If more men come we 
will put on finishing touches,” Daily Telegraph, 3 November 1915, 3.
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There was much to account for in the immediate aftermath 
of the crater fight. In a secondary report from Lt-Col McAvity to 
5th Brigade Headquarters, the officer commanding 26th Battalion 
attempted to explain the apparent discrepancies between his reports 
prior to and in consequence of the attack of the crater. McAvity 
referenced the earlier reconnaissance conducted by Lt Knowlton: 
“Reports which were sent in to us and forwarded on to the effect 
that the top of the crater was boarded in and sentries were stationed 
behind an earth parapet can now be accounted for by the fact that 
sounds as men on boards would of course come from their parties 
passing up and down the communication trench which led into the 
crater. The sentries apparently stood on the near edge of the crater 
looking out over the earth which had been thrown up all around.” 
As for the unanticipated mine detonation, McAvity added that “[i]t 
would appear that the Germans had expected an attempt to be made 
on this place as they had a mine underneath it which they sprung, 
fortunately for us, some seconds too late.”30
Lt-Col McAvity also wished to draw attention to the actions of 
Sgt W.C. Ryer who, in addition to having recovered two wounded men 
from the battlefield, claimed to have killed eleven of the enemy during 
the engagement. McAvity’s commendation, registered with Brigadier-
General Watson the day after the crater fight, is brief but trenchant: 
“Sergeant Ryer, under a very heavy cross-fire from machine guns 
and rifles, carried a mortally wounded comrade, Sergeant Cotter, 
until the latter expired, when he left him and returned to the crater 
and with the help of Private F.L. Daley, brought in another wounded 
man, Private D. Winchester.”31 
Major-General R.E.W. Turner, VC, commanding the 2nd 
Canadian Division, saw tremendous value in the demonstration 
executed by the British 2nd Army: “It helps materially in 
encouraging the offensive spirit in all ranks and showed them how 
30  26th Battalion, Operations, O.C., 26th Battalion to 5th C.I.B., “Additional 
Report on Demonstration Afternoon October 13th,” n.d., RG 9 III, Vol. 4122, Folder 
4, File 1, LAC.
31  26th Battalion, Operations, O.C., 26th Battalion to 5th C.I.B., “Re Conspicuous 
Gallantry Sergeant W.C. Ryer (no. 69805),” 14 October 1915, RG 9 III, Vol. 4122, 
Folder 4, File 1, LAC.
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easily the enemy can be upset.”32 He was similarly impressed with 
the reconnaissance performed by the 26th Battalion, in spite of the 
casualties. Lt-Col McAvity made no further comment or observation 
concerning the crater fight. He may have been satisfied with the 
days’ events, but his main concerns following the operation were the 
need to repair his trenches, the continued extension of the sap head 
from the Canadian lines to the K1 crater and the recovery of bodies 
from no man’s land.33
Owing to the excitement of the afternoon’s attack and the enemy’s 
agitation, the 26th Battalion was unable to retrieve their dead on the 
evening of 13 October. Obscured by fog, recovery parties set out 
under cover of darkness the following night.34 It was assumed, after 
the retreat, that all of the wounded had been recovered and that only 
the dead lay in no man’s land. That was not the case. Pte William 
Ramsay, one of the party that attacked the crater, was determined to 
return to no man’s land to retrieve the dead:
I later went out to the listening post and borrowed a pair of field 
glasses; and when I looked through them I saw the dead scattered about 
the field, that is between the firing lines. I heard some one groaning, 
and I came back and reported it to Sergeant Wilson. He thought that 
I was crazy.
I returned and reported that some one was living near the crater. The 
crater is only fifteen yards away from the German trenches. Sergeant 
Wilson came up that night and asked me if I was game enough to go 
out, and I told him that I certainly was. We went out together and the 
first fellow we ran across was Bobby Keenan. We rolled him over. He 
was dead, so we crept by two or three more and went clean out to the 
crater; and right on the edge of the crater lay [Pte M.E.] McPhee and 
Bobby Knowles. I rolled McPhee over. He was dead.
32  War Diaries, 2nd Canadian Division, October 1915, Appendix 41, 2nd Canadian 
Division to Canadian Corps, No. G [unreadable], 15 October 1915, Vol. 4842, File 
99, LAC.
33  “Major Brown of 26th in City; Tells of the Famous Crater Fight,” Daily Telegraph, 
27 December 1915, 6.
34  Major W.H. Belyea, 18 October 1915, “Co-operation in Raising Three New 
Battalions,” Daily Telegraph, 19 November 1915, 3.
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I felt Bobby Knowles’ hand, and it was all covered with mud, and I 
thought that he was dead too. But I felt around until I got the back of 
his neck, and I gave him a roll over and he gave a groan. The Germans 
immediately opened fire on us, so I got Sergeant Wilson’s jackknife and 
cut all the equipment off him. I got him on my back and crept in with 
him, Sergeant Wilson steadying him on my back.
When we got in with him there were two fellows, Corporal Knight 
and Charlie McQuaid, who came out and met us for we certainly were 
played out. So we took Bobby in Sergeant Wilson’s hut and rubbed him 
down with some rum and got him around first rate. Sergeant Wilson 
and I then went out and fetched in Bobby Keenan’s body. A relief party 
then came out and brought in the rest of the dead.35
Knowles succumbed to his wounds the following day.
By the time the 26th Battalion left the line on the evening 
of 15 October, only Sgt Cotter’s body remained unaccounted for. 
Rumours circulated that he may have been taken prisoner; however, 
as witnesses to his death stepped forward, this notion was quickly 
discredited. According to Captain A. McMillan, “He lay nearest of all 
to the German lines, and we think the enemy brought him in to get 
information as to the force who attacked.”36 For the survivors of the 
crater fight, it was time to reflect, to record their impressions of the 
battle and to rest. More fighting was ahead. 
the “myth of the war experience”
The crater fight was the 26th Battalion’s baptism of fire and, by 
all accounts, they performed well: their attack was co-ordinated; 
their reconnaissance was effective; and, while their retreat was 
problematic, the engagement of supporting troops—the engineers, 
machine gunners, smoke bombers and stretcher-bearers—helped save 
many lives. Yet, in spite of the positive outcome, the crater fight was 
a relatively minor event. It was narrow in both scale and duration 
35  William Ramsey to Fred Ramsey, n.d., “Late Private Knowles Found in Crater,” 
Daily Telegraph, 8 December 1915, 4.
36  Captain A. McMillan to R.J. Cotter, n.d., “Lieut. F.M. Smith Got German Sniper 
Who Wounded Him,” Daily Telegraph, 2 November 1915, 4.
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and its outcome offered limited tactical advantage. It may very well 
have been the first trench raid of its kind within the Canadian Corps, 
predating the Canadian raid at Petite Douve in November 1915, but 
its lack of sophistication and the fact that it was conducted in broad 
daylight with a large number of casualties ensured that it would not 
be held up as a model of minor operations.37
37  See Colin Garrett, “The Art of Minor Operations: Canadian Trench Raiding, 
1915-1918,” Canadian Military History 24, 1 (2015): 249-284. Garret does not 
mention the 26th Battalion’s crater fight, claiming instead that the 7th Battalion’s 
night-time raid at Petite Douve was the first trench raid of its kind. It is easy to see 
why the latter draws considerably more attention: it was well planned and rehearsed; 
it netted a number of enemy prisoners and intelligence; and it resulted in only two 
casualties. This was the model of minor operations that was to follow with increasing 
frequency and success.
Within weeks of the crater fight, dozens of first-hand accounts—most complimentary, some 
contradictory—were published in New Brunswick’s newspapers. [St. John Globe, 3 November 
1915, p. 3]
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It was the propaganda value of the crater fight that most interested 
military and political authorities. War news, crafted by the official 
Eye-Witness and filtered through government censors, reinforced 
wartime ideals and helped boost military recruitment: “it was not 
a huge ethical leap for reporters to provide, and their newspapers to 
accept, ridiculously upbeat versions of battle,” explains historian Jeff 
Keshen.38 More often than not, these reports were written in London, 
far from the field of battle, and based primarily upon the after-action 
reports of field commanders who had a direct stake in how the war 
was being perceived at home. Criticism of the management of the war 
or its human cost was generally omitted.39
Historian Jonathan Vance contends that such myth-making was 
largely a post-war construction—“Strict adherence to historical fact 
was desirable,” he writes, “but only if such facts did not contradict 
the myth. It was the myth, not fact, that was paramount.”40 Yet, 
curiously, battlefield narratives from official sources seldom found 
any contradiction from the soldiers they reported upon. Letters 
written soon after Second Ypres and Vimy, for instance, reinforced 
common propaganda stereotypes of valour and righteousness while 
simultaneously downplaying the more salient aspects of warfare.41 
It mattered little that some of these soldiers did not actually engage 
in the battle. They looked to newspaper reports and other sources, 
such as Max Aitken’s highly flattering Canada in Flanders series, 
for a better understanding of their own experiences.42 In essence, the 
38  Jeffrey A. Keshen, Propaganda and Censorship During Canada’s Great War 
(Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1996), xiii.
39  Jeff Keshen, “All the News That Was Fit to Print: Ernest J. Chambers and 
Information Control in Canada, 1914-19,” Canadian Historical Review 73, 3 (1992): 
323.
40  Vance, Death So Noble, 163.
41  Ryan B. Flavelle, “The Second Battle of Ypres and 100 Years of Remembrance,” 
Canadian Military History 24, 1 (2015): 224; and Maarten Gerritsen, “Corps Identity: 
the Letters, Diaries and Memoirs of Canada’s Great War Soldiers,” (PhD dissertation, 
Memorial University, 2008), 166. Self-censorship served a number of purposes. Jeff 
Keshen notes that soldiers may have deliberately avoided entanglement with unit 
censors by writing upbeat letters home. Others may not have been able to adequately 
express their feelings, felt that no one could understand their experiences or were 
too masculine to overtly state their fears and frustrations. Keshen, Propaganda 
and Censorship, 189-190. See also Tim Cook, The Secret History of Soldiers: How 
Canadians Survived the Great War (Toronto: Allen Lane, 2018), 171-172.
42  See, for instance, his depiction of the crater fight in Canada in Flanders: the 
Official Story of the Canadian Expeditionary Force, Vol. II (London: Hodder and 
Stoughton, 1917), 38-40.
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circular nature of wartime reporting had the effect of fusing together 
differing points of views, both fact and fiction, while sanitising them 
for public consumption.
This was the genesis of the “myth of the war experience”: as much 
as it unified the collective memory of soldiers still coming to terms with 
their experiences in the immediate post-war years as Vance contends, 
it was also a real-time phenomenon that amplified and satisfied 
varied regional interests. Ypres and Vimy aside, local battalions and 
figures were elevated to near-mythical status by city editors and 
provincial newspapers for events that would have otherwise escaped 
national attention. Minor engagements became cause célèbres—a 
means of dealing with the death of people whose names were known, 
Editorials applauded the 26th Battalion’s crater attack and called upon its male readers to 
embrace the war effort by enlisting. [The Daily Telegraph and the Sun (Saint John), 18 October 1915, p. 6]
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of engaging citizens with the war effort and of raising more troops 
for the cause. Indeed, for New Brunswick, the crater fight came to 
represent what Caribou Hill meant to Newfoundland.43
Editorials were quick to capitalise on the crater fight. “Last 
week’s operations formed practically their baptism of fire,” boasted 
the St. John Standard, “and a thrill of pride will go through the 
province this morning at the intelligence that, when the opportunity 
came, they did their duty in the manner expected of the men of 
New Brunswick.”44 Similar sentiments were expressed in the Daily 
Telegraph (Saint John): “The one point on which there is no doubt 
is that the men of the 26th are standing up to the test of war like 
veterans and are adding to the reputation established by the Princess 
Patricia’s and other Canadian units which have been longer under 
fire.”45 As the publication of casualty lists over the days and weeks 
that followed began to dampen public spirit, newspapers held firm: 
“Today, when we are called upon to count the cost,” assured the 
Standard, “the pride is deepened.”46
First-hand accounts of the crater fight began arriving from the 
front in early November. These stories were engaging, idealistic and 
emotive. Depictions of bravery and self-sacrifice reinforced the public 
impression being crafted by the province’s largest newspapers that 
the 26th Battalion had won for itself, and by extension the people of 
New Brunswick, a significant achievement. Everyone wanted to share 
their experience under fire, but, as Fred Breau warned his father, “[t]
here was a lot of the men that were not in that fight.”47 So how much 
of what was written in the aftermath of the attack was accurate? 
Contradictions were evident from the start but, rather than undermine 
the credibility of the witnesses, elements of the crater fight were fused, 
transformed and recollected as an imperfect but accepted story.
Exaggeration was the hallmark of the Canadian effort, alternating 
between portrayals of bravado and self-sacrifice. “The boys behaved 
finely, doing their work coolly, helping comrades, laughing at their 
wounds and swearing at the Germans alternately,” claimed Pte Jack 
43  Tim Cook and Mark Osborne Humphries, “The Forgotten Campaign: 
Newfoundland at Gallipoli,” Canadian Military History 27, 1 (2018): 1-39.
44  “The Fighting 26th,” St. John Standard, 18 October 1915, 4.
45  “The 26th Battalion,” Daily Telegraph, 18 October 1915, 6.
46  “The ‘Fighting 26th.’,” St. John Standard, 27 October 1915, 4.
47  Fred Breau to James Breau, 17 October 1915, “‘More exciting than a Cove picnic,’ 
Writes Corp. Breau,” Daily Telegraph, 9 November 1915, 4.
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Willis two days after the crater fight.48 In the calm aftermath of 
battle, more shocking features faded: the screams of the wounded 
were replaced by thundering Jack Johnsons; bullets that buzzed like 
bees around one’s head omitted the fact that Canadian fire routinely 
found friendly targets; and Canadian casualties did not suffer so 
much as endure, compose themselves and accept their fate with 
dignity. According to Lt Ferguson, “One chap with a leg shot off 
and two bullets through his stomach, smoked a cigarette and joked 
about the wooden leg he would have to get now. He died about six 
hours later, conscious all through.”49 Pte Frank Lockhart describes 
another casualty “who had his leg practically blown off. This chum 
talked and joked and thought he was all right. He died in the trench 
with a smile on his face, while talking to [Pte] Whitehead.”50 These 
depictions were hardly realistic, but they allowed soldiers to normalise 
their experiences for public consumption. 
The German response was portrayed in less flattering terms. 
According to Pte Gordon Leslie, the Germans “ran and left their 
trenches like sheep” when bombarded.51 Another account says that “a 
lot of them jumped out of their trenches and tore off to the woods in 
fear.”52 Both reports are prejudicial and highly inflammatory. Other 
accounts are more conciliatory in how the Germans reacted to the 
British demonstration: “The Germans, beyond a doubt, were caught 
by surprise,” surmised Lt Ferguson, “but they quickly woke up.”53 
“As the wind blew this cloud over their trench they began to rush 
up troops to meet the attack they felt sure we were going to deliver. 
Then we opened on these supports with rapid fire, machine gun and 
artillery fire,” added Maj W.H. Belyea.54 “The Germans lost heavily 
as they had brought heavy reinforcements up expecting a general 
48  Jack Willis to Mrs. C.J. Willis, 15 October 1915, “Jack Willis of Sussex, Tells of 
Brave 26th,” Kings County Record, 12 November 1915, 1.
49  Lieutenant H.W. Ferguson to W.H. Ferguson, 14 October 1915, “Gripping Story 
of the Soldiers Battles,” Campbellton Graphic, 4 November 1915, 1.
50  Private Frank Lockhart to his mother, n.d., “Glace Bay Victims of Barbarity,” St. 
John Globe, 17 December 1915, 3.
51  Private Gordon Leslie to Mrs. Leslie, 16 October 1915, “Miramichi Boy Who Lost 
His Life in Empire’s Cause,” Daily Gleaner, 4 November 1915, 2.
52  Unidentified, 14 October 1915, “Sergt. Ryder, of 26th, for V.C.,” St. John Globe, 
3 November 1915, 5.
53  Lieutenant H.W. Ferguson to W.H. Ferguson, 14 October 1915, “Gripping Story 
of the Soldiers Battles,” Campbellton Graphic, 4 November 1915, 1.
54  Major W.H. Belyea, 18 October 1915, “Co-operation in Raising Three New 
Battalions,” Daily Telegraph, 19 November 1915, 3.
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attack. Our artillery played on their trenches and destroyed them 
to the extent that when their reinforcements retired there [sic] was 
exposed to our machine gun and rifle fire,” wrote Pte Elden Schwartz, 
in charge of one of the smoke bombing parties.55 These accounts 
reinforce the Canadian narrative. If the Germans ran away under 
fire, then the Canadians are portrayed as valiant; if they remained 
at their posts and were slaughtered, then they were simply out-
manoeuvred. “I tell you they lost heavily, while our casualties were 
few,” continued Pte Leslie to his mother, three days after the crater 
fight. “[T]hey were carrying wounded out for two days,” added Sgt 
H.T. Spare.56 Battalion, brigade and divisional sources are curiously 
silent on the issue of how many Germans were killed on 13 October; 
however, specific claims range from as few as 300 men to as many 
as 5,000, concentrated mainly on Petit Bois. The Germans certainly 
sustained heavy losses, but estimates above 400 seems exceedingly 
high for the frontage along the K and L lines that would have been 
covered by the 26th Battalion. Casualties directly inflicted by “A” 
Company and those men in fire support would actually have been 
quite light, limited to those enemy soldiers manning the crater, the 
newly discovered communication trench linking the crater to the 
German front line and as far forward as the German firing trench 
facing the crater. Significantly higher losses were inflicted by indirect 
artillery fire in the lead-up to the attack. 300 to 400 dead and a ratio 
of four-to-one, as Lt Ferguson estimated, are the limit of credibility.57 
Claims that upwards of ten Germans were killed for every one of the 
26th Battalion, predicated on the notion that “there were thousands 
and thousands of the enemy waiting and watching for them,” are 
simply mythogenic.58
It comes as no surprise, then, that other details of the attack 
do not hold up to scrutiny. Sgt Ryer’s assertion that he eliminated 
eleven enemy soldiers inside German lines, for instance, may have 
55  Elden Schwartz to Reverend A.S. Hazel, 18 October 1915, “A Few Lines from 
Schwartz,” Carleton Sentinel, 5 November 1915, 1.
56  Sergeant H.T. Spare to a friend, n.d., “9th Out on Muster Parade,” Daily 
Telegraph, 11 December 1915, 3.
57  Ian J. Campbell, ed., The Personal Diary of Lieutenant Harry Wensley Ferguson: 
the 26th New Brunswick Battalion (self-pub., 2007), 221-222.
58  Private William McKay to Robert McKay, 17 October 1915, “Twelve-Year-Old 
Pleads to Go to Front as Bugler,” Daily Telegraph, 4 November 1915, 6; and “Major 
Brown of 26th in City; Tells of the Famous Crater Fight,” Daily Telegraph, 27 
December 1915, 6.
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been exaggerated. Several testimonials support his claim, including 
that of Maj Brown: “The fellow Ryer was missing. About an hour 
later I heard that Ryer had turned up. So I sent for him and asked 
him where he had been. He replied: ‘I found a nice little spot where 
I could do a little potting; I found that as the Germans left the 
trenches to throw their bombs I could see them and get a shot at 
them. So I just stayed there and shot at them. I managed to bowl 
over eleven of them.’”59 The smoke that obscured Ryer’s advance to 
the crater, however, would have made it equally difficult for him to 
identify specific German targets beyond his own attacking party. 
As Lt Ferguson attested, “The dense cloud of smoke hid everything 
from view excepting where here and there a swirl of air would reveal 
the hurrying, moving forms, while all the time the air was alive 
with rifle and machine gun bullets, shrapnel, shells and bombs of all 
descriptions.”60 The smoke did abate as “A” company retreated from 
the crater, but that hardly seems long enough for Ryer to snipe eleven 
Germans from an open and fixed position given all of the movement 
taking place in and around the crater.
Ryer’s claim to the Distinguished Conduct Medal is similarly 
clouded in controversy. His official citation, published in the London 
Gazette six weeks after the attack, makes no mention of the eleven 
Germans killed, concentrating solely upon his rescue of “another 
Serjeant, who was mortally wounded, until the latter died, when 
he returned to the crater and, with the assistance of another man, 
carried back a second man ... under a heavy crossfire from machine 
guns and rifles.”61 Sgt Ryer’s story is certainly compelling: “I found 
that I was alone and that the rest had gone back,” he told Maj 
Brown, “so I thought I would look around a little first and see if 
there was anybody I could take back. I found one man on the ground 
but he said that it was no use, that he was done for. I stayed here a 
few moments till he died and then I found another fellow who was 
not mortally wounded.”62 The first soldier that Ryer came upon was 
Sgt Frank Cotter; however, Pte William Mackay states that he was 
59  “Major Brown of 26th in City; Tells of the Famous Crater Fight,” Daily Telegraph, 
27 December 1915, 6.
60  Lieutenant H.W. Ferguson to Mrs. Charles Reid, n.d., “If more men come we will 
put on finishing touches,” Daily Telegraph, 3 November 1915, 3.
61  London Gazette, 26 November 1915, Supplement 29384, 11901.
62  “Major Brown of 26th in City; Tells of the Famous Crater Fight,” Daily Telegraph, 
27 December 1915, 6.
27
Mainville: Between Fact and Fiction
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2020
28 Between Fact and Fiction
the one who carried out Sgt Cotter: “I got him on my back with 
the help of another soldier, but he got shot again in the head and 
fell off my back dead.”63 This version is corroborated by Pte J.T. 
Oram and by the Daily Gleaner (Fredericton) in its post-war review 
of the 26th Battalion.64 Lt Ferguson appears to reconcile the two 
stories—it was Sgt Ryer who rescued Pte Winchester and “one of 
my bombers” who attempted to save Cotter—but, by this point, the 
competing narratives had become conflated into a single, unifying act 
of courage, deserving of the Victoria Cross “in any former war” if one 
is to believe Major-General Turner at Sgt Ryer’s medal ceremony.65
The crater fight had now taken on a life of its own: it made heroes 
of Maj Brown, Sgt Ryer and the “picked thirty,” it featured a popular 
story that New Brunswick readers could embrace as their own and it 
gave rise to its own poetry. It also proved to be an effective recruiting 
tool. As three new battalions were being announced for the province, 
soldiers of the 26th Battalion used the crater fight to appeal to the 
duty of the province’s youth: “They are having a hard time to get 
recruits, but if some of them saw the graveyards out here I don’t think 
they would be satisfied to stay at home, they would want to have 
revenge for our brothers who have gone before us,” proclaimed Pte 
Kenneth Linton to his mother.66 “[I]f some of the slackers in Canada 
were only here, to see, or could realize what we are up against, they 
would not be so backward in responding to the call,” echoed Pte 
Elden Schwartz to his pastor.67
63  Private William McKay to Robert McKay, 17 October 1915, “Twelve-Year-Old 
Pleads to Go to Front as Bugler,” Daily Telegraph, 4 November 1915, 6.
64  Private J.T. Oram to his mother, Mrs. William Oram, 17 October 1915, “Wounded 
in Arm, Buried by Shell Fire, Roy Brady Went on in Crater Battle,” Daily Telegraph, 
5 November 1915, 4; and “The Fighting Record of the Good Old 26th New Brunswick 
Battalion,” Daily Gleaner, 17 May 1919, 8.
65  “Presentation of D.C.M. to Sergt. Ryer,” St. John Globe, 23 November 1915, 5. 
Turner was a recipient of the Victoria Cross for his actions on the Transvaal and 
naturally viewed any act that mirrored his own reputation for “reckless bravery” 
as deserving of the Empire’s highest honour. First World War standards, however, 
proved considerably higher than those of the South African Campaign, as a more 
detailed examination of Ryer’s actions clearly reveal. See Thomas P. Leppard, ““The 
Dashing Subaltern”: Sir Richard Turner in Retrospect,” Canadian Military History 
6, 2 (1997): 22; and Hugh A. Halliday, Valour Reconsidered (Toronto: Robin Brass 
Studio, 2006).
66  Private Kenneth Linton to Mrs. A. Linton, n.d., “26th Now in Fire Trenches,” 
Daily Telegraph, 18 November 1915, 4.
67  Private Elden Schwartz to Rev. A.S. Hazel, 18 October 1915, “A Few Lines from 
Schwartz,” Carleton Sentinel, 5 November 1915, 1.
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Reverend Captain Hooper, the battalion’s firebrand and 
popular minister, was a regular contributor to Saint John’s daily 
newspapers. His appeals to manhood and patriotism were already 
common themes in his letters home; his description of the crater 
fight as “sorrow gilded with pride” and his call to support those 
who “bring honor to themselves and their country in carrying the 
flag on to victory, the complete victory” merely focused the efforts 
of clergymen and editors at home to boost recruitment further.68 
“These letters should fire the enthusiasm of the men at home and 
make them realize where lies the path of duty,” extolled the St. John 
Globe.69 “What do the young men of this city and this province think 
about it?” responded the Daily Telegraph. “None can fail to read of 
the bravery of the 26th without a feeling of keen satisfaction ... Let 
every man who is free to enlist read the latest story of Canadian 
gallantry and then take up the matter with his own conscience.”70 
Such appeals, accompanied by interviews with returning veterans of 
the 26th Battalion, helped increase recruiting above national levels 
through December 1915; thereafter, as casualties mounted and the 
number of able-bodied men declined, volunteerism would resume its 
downward spiral through the last few months of the patriotic phase, 
the conscription era and war’s end.71
The celebration that marked the return of New Brunswick’s 26th 
Battalion to Saint John on 17 May 1919 was unlike anything the city 
had ever witnessed, but, as the St. John Globe warned its readers, “[t]
he units that went away are returning, not it is true as they went.”72 
The estimated 673 soldiers of the unit who marched from Union 
Depot to King Square were eager to be home; only 121, however, 
could be counted among the almost 1,200 men of the battalion that 
had departed the Loyalist City four years earlier. These men had 
68  Captain (Reverend) E.B. Hooper, 17 October 1915, “‘He that is not with us is 
against us,’ Chaplain’s Call to Men from the Front,” Daily Telegraph (Saint John), 
2 November 1915, 3. See also “The Fighting 26th,” Daily Telegraph, 3 November 
1915, 6.
69  Editorial, St. John Globe, 30 October 1915, 6.
70  “The 26th Battalion,” Daily Telegraph, 18 October 1915, 6.
71  Curtis Mainville, Till the Boys Come Home: Life on the Home Front, Queens 
County, NB, 1914-1918 (Fredericton: Goose Lane Editions, 2015), Figure 1, 37.
72  “Editorial: Their Welcome Home,” St. John Globe, 17 May 1919, 4.
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survived the Battle of the Somme and Vimy. They witnessed Hill 70, 
Passchendaele, Amiens and the Scarpe. Then just when it seemed 
that the war would never end, they found the will to march on 
Cambrai on their way to Mons. But it all began with the crater fight.
At the head of the battalion marched Lt-Col W.R. Brown. He 
had led “A” Company into the crater; now he commanded all that 
remained of the 26th. Further in line marched Pte W.A. Ramsay 
who was among the party that had recovered the dead from the 
battlefield. Many names were noticeably absent from the arrival: Lt 
C.M. Lawson, whose private commentary brought balance and insight 
into the crater fight, was killed in action soon after the engagement; 
Pte W.H. McKay, credited but never recognised for his attempt to 
Poetry, written by those who witnessed war firsthand and those at home who could only 
imagine it, helped shape the “myth of the war experience.” [St. John Globe, 22 February 1916, p. 7]
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rescue Sgt Cotter from the battlefield, died of a shell wound in 1917; 
and Lieutenant (Captain) M.N. McPhee, the engineering officer whose 
quick actions saved the lives of many soldiers, was later awarded the 
Military Cross and drowned when the Hospital Ship Lanfranc was 
sunk in the British Channel in 1917. Also missing from the reception 
were Lieutenant (Major) C.E. Fairweather, DSO, MID and Sgt W.C. 
Ryer, DCM. Both had been wounded and repatriated to Canada 
during the war.
The crater fight may have done “more to arouse St. John and New 
Brunswick generally to a sense of seriousness of the war than perhaps 
any other agency,” as newspaper editors R.W. Gould and S.K. Smith 
recounted in their regimental history of the 26th Battalion.73 Yet 
its military significance is limited largely to its propaganda value 
in uniting a province around the war effort and boosting Canadian 
Expeditionary Force enlistment. Official histories written in the post-
war era do not mention the crater fight; historians of First World War 
tactics and minor operations similarly ignore the engagement opposite 
Vandamme Farm. Only recently have the 26th Battalion and their 
daylight raid merited wider attention. Like the German mine crater 
at K1 itself, the crater fight appears to have been consumed within 
the larger mythology of the First World War experience and the 
collective memory of its participants.
As surviving members of the 26th Battalion Overseas Club 
gathered each spring to celebrate the departure of the unit for England, 
attention invariably turned from the crater fight to the larger battles 
that were to follow.74 Published accounts of the Somme and Vimy in 
the province’s newspapers represented the greater proportion of how 
those events were interpreted in real-time and, after the war, how 
they would be remembered. They too are filled with contradiction. 
Most spared realism for self-censorship and high diction. The appetite 
for such stories was insatiable and, as newspaper accounts filtered 
back to the troops at the front, tales of courage and self-sacrifice 
reinforced their own interpretation of events far better than anything 
73  R.W. Gould and S.K. Smith, The Glorious Story of the Fighting 26th (Montreal: 
Montreal Standard, 1918), 11. Lord Beaverbrook, Canada in Flanders, Vol. II 
(Toronto: Hodder and Stoughton, 1917), 38-40; and Roland H. Hill, “From Givenchy 
to St. Eloi,” in Canada in the Great World War, Vol. III (Toronto: United Publishers 
of Canada, 1920), 224 offer contemporary accounts of the crater fight, although it 
must be said that their version of events are more quixotic than informative.
74  Wilson, A Family of Brothers, 264-266.
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that might have provoked feelings of fear and helplessness. The crater 
fight may have been the first to meld fact and fiction into a single, 
unifying memory but it was certainly not the last for members of 
New Brunswick’s 26th Battalion.
◆     ◆     ◆     ◆
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